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WHEN THE SANHEDRIN FINDS NO MERIT

From the Talks of
The Lubavitcher Rebbe
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1.

An Order Reversed

In *Hilchos Sanhedrin*,¹ the Rambam states the following ruling:

When all the judges of a Sanhedrin begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable, he is acquitted. There must be some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable. Only then is he executed.

The source for this ruling is the *Gemara in Sanhedrin*:²

In a Sanhedrin where all the judges saw fit to convict the defendant [in a case involving capital punishment], they acquit him. [The Gemara asks:] What is the reasoning [for this halachah]? It is because it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight (halanas din) is necessary in order to create a possibility of acquittal. And as those judges [all saw fit to convict him, they] will not see [any further possibility to acquit] him, [because there will not be anyone arguing for such a verdict. Consequently, he cannot be convicted].

The Rambam's wording deviates from that of the *Gemara*. {Where the *Gemara* says} the judges all "saw fit to convict the defendant," the Rambam writes that they all "begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable." Presumably, the Rambam phrased it this way simply to spell the matter out more fully — a characteristic approach of later authorities.³ When the *Gemara* says briefly that the judges all "**saw fit** to convict the defendant," it means that they all "begin their judgment ... and say that the defendant is liable." In other words, right from the very start of the proceedings,⁴ the judges found no basis for acquittal. At the outset, they all "say that the defendant is liable."

It is likewise understandable why the Rambam omits the *Gemara's* reason — "What is the reasoning [for this halachah]? It is because it is learned as a tradition ... And those

1) *Hilchos Sanhedrin* 9:1.

2) *Sanhedrin* 17a (end), as cited by the commentators on the Rambam — *Radvaz*, *Kessef Mishneh*, and others.

3) See *Yad Malachi*, *Kelalei HaRambam*, sec. 24; and elsewhere.

4) One might suggest that the Rambam derived this from the *Gemara's* own wording: it says that the judges "**saw fit** to convict," not that they "deliberated." This implies that there was no discussion at all; from the outset, they all saw fit to convict the defendant.

judges will not see [any further possibility to acquit] him.” The Rambam simply doesn’t include rationales behind *halachos* in his code.⁵

The continuation of the Rambam’s words, however — “he is acquitted. There must be some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable. Only then is he executed” — demands explanation.

{Two things stand out:}

- a) This *halachah* serves as an introduction and foundation to the chapter’s general theme — the definition of what constitutes a majority for liability and a majority for acquittal. Given that, the Rambam should seemingly have **led with the main point**: the conclusion of the *halachah* — that liability in capital cases arises specifically when “there are some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable.” Only afterward should he have added, “but if all the judges of a *Sanhedrin* begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable, he is acquitted.”
- b) The Rambam lays out {both sides of this ruling:} acquittal where all “say that the defendant is liable,” and liability where “there are some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf, but yet the majority hold him liable.” {Since these are two sides of one ruling,} the Rambam’s concluding phrase should likewise have reflected that parallelism. Instead of “Only then is he **executed**,” one would expect something like “Only then does he become **liable**”⁶ — the natural counterpart to “he is **acquitted**.”

2.

Which Flaw, and Whose?

This will be understood by first clarifying the *Gemara*’s reasoning:

It is because it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight is necessary in order to create a possibility of acquittal. And as those judges [all saw fit to convict him, they] will not see [any further possibility to acquit] him.

Seemingly, this can be understood in two ways:

- a) The essential point is the suspension of the trial overnight, and {when the *Gemara* says} “in order to create a possibility of acquittal,” it is merely explaining why that suspension is required. On this reading, the reason that “they acquit him” is that

5) See the Alter Rebbe’s *Hilchos Talmud Torah*, *Kuntres Acharon*, beginning of ch. 2.

6) This would parallel the Rambam’s wording elsewhere in this chapter (pars. 2, 3), and in other contexts.

once all the judges “saw fit to convict the defendant,” it becomes impossible to fulfill one of the conditions that apply in a case where the judges cannot find any grounds for acquittal⁷ — namely, the requirement of suspending the trial overnight.

- b) The reason for the acquittal is that “**those judges** will not see [any further possibility to acquit] him,” and the reference to the suspension of the trial overnight merely points to this underlying cause.⁸

On this reading, the reason that “they acquit him” is not that the court is unable to fulfill one of the conditions, but that once all the judges “saw fit to convict the defendant,” “they will not see [any further possibility to acquit] him.” Consequently, what is lacking here is the fulfillment of “the congregation shall judge ... and the congregation shall save”⁹ — a congregation that saves.¹⁰ A court that cannot see a possibility of acquittal is not qualified to convict; therefore “they acquit him.”

Put differently: according to the first approach, the deficiency concerns the *Sanhedrin*’s **ruling** — no proper court ruling can be issued, because the condition of suspending the trial overnight has not been fulfilled.¹¹ According to the second approach, the deficiency lies with the **one** issuing the ruling — in the *Sanhedrin* themselves.

This is similar to the case of “a *Sanhedrin* that saw someone kill another person,” whose members cannot serve as judges (according to Rabbi Akiva) — “for the Merciful One states: ‘the congregation shall judge ... and the congregation shall save,’ and since they saw him kill a person, they cannot see any possibility of acquittal for him.”¹² This does not mean that their ruling is incorrect, but rather that they do not qualify as a *Sanhedrin* with respect to the person whom they “saw ... kill another person.”

3.

Evidence for Each Approach

The *Gemara* itself provides grounds for both the first approach and the second.

7) See Rashi on *Sanhedrin* 17a, s.v. *keivan degemiri*.

8) {Since the purpose of the suspension is to allow the court to find a possibility of acquittal, it presupposes that the court must be capable of finding one.}

9) *Bamidbar* 35:24–25.

10) Mishnah, *Sanhedrin* 2a (end); and similarly in many other sources. See below in the body of the *sichah*, citing *Rosh Hashanah* 26a.

11) Note *Kiryas Sefer* by the *Mabit* on *Hilchos Sanhedrin*, ad loc., who is uncertain whether the ruling that “they acquit him” in this case is a Torah law or a rabbinic one.

12) *Rosh Hashanah* 25b (end) ff.

Support for the first approach can be inferred from the *Gemara*'s precise wording: it mentions only the law that "it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight is necessary," and not the source for the requirement that the court seek a possibility of acquittal for the defendant.¹³ This is all the more striking since the *Gemara* does not cite the reason it gives elsewhere — in the passage discussed above regarding "a *Sanhedrin* that saw someone kill another person" — that "the Merciful One states: 'the congregation shall judge ... and the congregation shall save.'" The implication is that what is decisive here is the inability to fulfill the *halachah* of suspending the trial overnight.

On the other hand, the *Gemara* does not stop at stating the law that "it is learned as a tradition that suspension of the trial overnight is necessary." It adds the explanation, "in order to create a possibility of acquittal," and concludes, "and as **those judges will not see** [any further possibility to acquit] **him**." This implies that the essential deficiency lies with "**those judges**" — in the fact that "they will not see [a possibility of acquittal] for him," as in the second approach.

Moreover, it is specifically according to the second approach that the *Gemara*'s choice of wording is best understood: "a *Sanhedrin* where all the judges **saw** fit to convict the defendant." That is, the deficiency lies in **their seeing** only grounds for conviction and therefore being unable to see any possibility of acquittal for him (similar to what was explained above regarding "**a *Sanhedrin* that saw** someone kill another person").

Accordingly, we can posit that the difference between the two approaches also has a practical *halachic* consequence. According to the first approach, where the deficiency lies in the court's **ruling**, it would follow that if the court later finds a possibility of acquittal, one can reasonably argue that they may try the defendant again.¹⁴

According to the second approach, however, since they do not qualify as a *Sanhedrin* with respect to this person — because "all the judges **saw** fit to convict the defendant" — it stands to reason that they can no longer try him at all, even if they later do find grounds to acquit him.

13) This principle is so fundamental that one who has argued for acquittal may not reverse himself and argue for conviction (*Sanhedrin* 32a, in the Mishnah; see also *Rashi*, ad loc., s.v. *eino*, who

explains that this stems from the requirement that "the congregation shall save").

14) This concept is **similar** to that which the Rambam writes in *Hilchos Sanhedrin* 10:9.

4.

A Ruling That Cannot Be Carried Out

The Rambam's words imply that he understands {the *Gemara*} according to **neither** of these two approaches.

Granted, it is not the Rambam's practice to include the rationales behind *halachos*. Even so, had he understood the deficiency to be the failure to fulfill the requirement of suspending the trial overnight — as in the first approach — he presumably would have mentioned it, since it is not merely the rationale behind the law but also one of the requirements for conviction.¹⁵

Conversely, the continuation of the Rambam's words indicates that the deficiency is not, as in the second approach, that the judges lack the capacity to see a possibility of acquittal once “all the judges **saw** fit to convict the defendant.” Rather, what is lacking is the actual presence of judges who “seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf.”

That is, the Rambam's wording — “he is acquitted. There must be some who ... Only then is he executed” — implies that the deficiency lies not with the one issuing the ruling, namely the *Sanhedrin*, but with the ruling's **implementation** as it pertains to the defendant.

Hence {two things}. First, the Rambam does not write “they acquit him,” which would emphasize that the acquittal derives from the court and its ruling. Instead, he writes “**he is acquitted**,” focusing on the defendant — that **he** is exempt from execution. Second, for the same reason, he continues, “There must be some who ... **Only then is he executed**.” It is through “some who seek to acquit him” that the possibility arises — not for a verdict of liability, {in which case the Rambam would have written,} “Only then does he **become liable**,” but for **carrying out** the ruling: “Only then is he **executed**.”¹⁶

5.

No Fault in the Court

To explain this, a brief preface is necessary.

Some commentaries¹⁷ explain the rationale behind the ruling concerning “a *Sanhedrin* [that] begin ...” as follows: the very fact that “all the judges ... begin ... and say

15) See *Encyclopedia Talmudis*, s.v. *Halanas HaDin*, toward the end, which states that some authorities are uncertain whether suspending judgment overnight is an indispensable requirement. See also the *Kiryas Sefer* cited above, fn. 11.

16) This also resolves the first question raised above in section 1.

17) *Maharatz Chayus on Sanhedrin*, ad loc. See also *Milchemes Mitzvah* (“by Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Rabbeinu Shimon Duran, known as the Rashbatz, author of the *Tashbetz*” — from the title page of the

that the defendant is liable” reveals a fundamental flaw within the *Sanhedrin* — that they did not approach the case properly. This is either because “they revealed their predisposition ... that they all wished to put him to death”;¹⁸ or because¹⁹ it is always possible to find some mitigating argument for innocence in any given case, and the fact that none of the judges found one proves either that they lack expertise in the law or that they rushed to judgment without properly deliberating the matter. There are several similar explanations along these lines, all pointing to a deficiency within the *Sanhedrin*.

However, it is highly implausible to make such a claim about any standard Jewish court, let alone the Great *Sanhedrin*.

[This ruling refers to the Great *Sanhedrin*, as explicitly stated by the Rambam according to a number of textual versions.²⁰ This also follows²¹ from the substance of the ruling itself: if the ruling referred to a minor *Sanhedrin* of twenty-three judges, why would “they acquit him”? He should have been tried before a different court,²² and, if necessary, the case and judgment should ultimately have been transferred to the Great *Sanhedrin*.]

Even a minor *Sanhedrin* is composed only of “men of wisdom and understanding, of unique distinction in their knowledge of the Torah, and of broad intellectual capacity.”²³ How is it conceivable that not **one of them** would approach the case properly?!

These explanations are all the more difficult in light of what was explained above: the Rambam’s wording demonstrates that this is not a deficiency in the *Sanhedrin* or in its ruling at all, but is entirely a matter relating to the defendant.

6.

When Punishment Cannot Atone

We may suggest the following explanation:

It is well known that the punishments imposed by a court — execution, lashes, and the like — are primarily for the sake of atonement. This is stated explicitly with regard to

undated Warsaw edition), where he references the Rambam’s ruling under discussion; *Be’er HaGolah* (Maharal), *Be’er HaSheni*.

18) *Milchemes Mitzvah*, *ibid*.

19) *Maharatz Chayus*, *ibid*.

20) See *Radvaz on the Rambam*; likewise cited by the *Migdal Oz* and the *Lechem Mishneh*. This is also the manuscript reading in the *Gemara*; see *Dikdukei Sofrim on Sanhedrin*, *ad loc*.

21) As noted by the *Or Sameach*, *ad loc*.

22) Note that *Milchemes Mitzvah* (*ibid*.) writes: “And even before a different court he will not be able to argue for his own acquittal; therefore he is exempted entirely.” The *Be’er HaGolah* there likewise concludes: “It is not for an earthly court to judge him; the Judge of all the earth shall judge him.” This is not the place to elaborate.

23) *Rambam, Hilchos Sanhedrin* 2:1.

lashes:²⁴ “*and your brother be degraded before your eyes* — once he has been flogged, he is like your brother.” The same idea appears²⁵ with regard to the punishment of execution: through it, the one punished attains the World to Come. This is reflected in *halachah* as well. The Rambam rules²⁶ that “all those liable for execution by the court or liable for lashes do not **attain atonement through death** or lashes unless they repent and confess.”²⁷ This implies that the purpose of execution by the court, or of lashes, is the atonement of the offender — though the atonement is conditional upon his repenting and confessing.

On this basis, it stands to reason that where execution by the court will not — indeed, cannot — bring about that atonement, there is no room to carry it out. This **resembles** the *Kessef Mishneh*’s explanation²⁸ of the Rambam’s ruling²⁹ concerning conspiring witnesses:

If the person against whom they testified was executed and then they were found to be conspirators, they are not executed. This is derived from the verse³⁰ that states, “what they conspired to do.” This implies that it was not already done ... If, however, the one against whom they testified was flogged, they are flogged.

The *Kessef Mishneh* explains the distinction as follows:

For we say “‘what they conspired to do’ — and not ‘what they did’” only where they had him executed on their testimony, because their sin is too great to bear, and it is not fitting to sentence them to execution by the court, which would atone for them. Rather, it is fitting to leave them to be judged after death with terrible punishments. An analogous case³¹ is one who gives all his offspring to Molech, who is exempt,³² whereas the same cannot be said where the victim was flogged on their testimony.

The same applies in our case. The judges of a valid court, of which it is said, “G-d stands in the Divine assembly,”³³ — and all the more so the Great *Sanhedrin* in the Chamber of Hewn Stone — all “begin ... and say that the defendant is liable” immediately, with not even one among them to argue for acquittal. This demonstrates that the defendant

24) *Devarim* 25:3; *Makkos* 23a (end), in the Mishnah (cited by Rashi on the verse).

25) Mishnah, *Sanhedrin* 43b.

26) Rambam, *Hilchos Teshuvah* 1:1.

27) In the *Gemara* (*Sanhedrin* 47a–b) there is a dispute between Abaye and Rava. According to Rava (and likewise Rav Yosef and Rav Ashi), one who is executed while still in his wickedness attains atonement {even without repentance, whereas according to Abaye, he does not}. The Rambam rules in accordance with Abaye; see *Tzafnas*

Paneach on the Rambam, ad loc. This is not the place to elaborate on the matter.

28) *Hilchos Eidus* 20:2, at the end.

29) *Hilchos Eidus*, *ibid.*

30) *Devarim* 19:19.

31) See the *Semag*, negative commandment 40.

32) *Sanhedrin* 64b; Rambam, *Hilchos Avodah Zarah* 6:4.

33) *Tehillim* 82:1. See also *Sanhedrin* 6b.

is one whose “sin is too great to bear”:³⁴ he is in such a degraded state that execution by the court is incapable of bringing him atonement. Therefore, “they acquit him.”

This explanation, however, does not adequately account for the Rambam’s wording — “**he is acquitted. There must be** {some who} ... Only then is he executed” — which implies that the *Sanhedrin*’s ruling is indeed a valid ruling, and that the defendant “is acquitted” only in the sense that the sentence cannot be executed upon him (as explained above in section 4). Yet according to what has just been explained, a *Sanhedrin* that “all ... begin ... and say that the defendant is liable” is effectively stating that, with respect to this person, the punishment **cannot** serve as atonement. If so, their ruling of “liable” is not a ruling at all. Accordingly, the *Gemara*’s wording, “they acquit him,” would have been more fitting, since it emphasizes that in such a case the court cannot issue a ruling because “his sin is too great to bear.”

7.

The Good Within Every Jew

A further explanation may be offered:

Regardless of a Jew’s state or condition, as the Rambam rules,³⁵ even one whom the court must physically **compel** to grant his wife a divorce ultimately “**wants to be part of the Jewish people, wants to perform all the mitzvos, and wants to distance himself from transgressions.**”

Even regarding Achan, who had descended to the very lowest depths, our Sages say:³⁶ “Even though he sinned, he is a Jew.”

The only question is the degree to which one’s “wish to perform all the *mitzvos*” — the innate good within every Jew — is revealed or concealed. In some Jews, this good is fully manifest; in others, it is less apparent; and there are those in whom it is entirely concealed. Yet even in them, some measure of this hidden good will ultimately be revealed. This is because the good within a Jew is not something merely added to his essence³⁷ — unlike his negative traits, which result solely from “**his evil inclination** [having] **overpowered him.**”³⁸ Rather, it constitutes the very core and absolute truth of his being.

34) Bereishis 4:13.

35) Hilchos Gerushin 2:20.

36) Sanhedrin 44a (beginning of the page).

37) See Sefer HaMaamarim 5659 (p. 85).

38) The wording of the Rambam, Hilchos Gerushin, ibid.

Accordingly, it is evident that for every Jew, whoever he may be — even at the very moment he commits a sin punishable by death — there must be a way to argue in his defense. For his true will, and the absolute truth of **his existence**, is the good **within him**.

However, when “all the judges of a *Sanhedrin* begin their judgment of a case involving capital punishment and say that the defendant is liable,” it demonstrates that the good within him has become so deeply concealed that even the Great *Sanhedrin* — who are “men of wisdom and understanding, [and] of unique distinction,” possessing the “understanding” to “derive one matter from another”³⁹ with exceptional acuity, and to perceive what is most deeply hidden — cannot find any way to argue on his behalf.

Regarding such a person, the rule is: “he is acquitted.” Since there is undoubtedly good within him, but **the court** simply **cannot** find it because it is completely concealed, the court’s ruling — and, more importantly, the ultimate purpose of that ruling — cannot be carried out in his case.

This reflects no deficiency in the court or in its judicial process. The Torah declares that “a judge has only what **his eyes** see,”⁴⁰ and all that the Great *Sanhedrin* “that will be in those days”⁴¹ was required — and able — to see, they did see. However, since the Torah of Truth rules that he genuinely “wants to perform all the *mitzvos*” — i.e., that there is intrinsic good within him, even if it remains unrevealed — the court’s ruling cannot take effect until “there [are] some who seek to acquit him ...”

A further point may be suggested: it is this inability to carry out the ruling against him that itself brings the hidden good into revelation. And once that good is brought to light, the court’s ruling can indeed take effect — and “[they] seek to acquit him ...”

On a deeper level: When can the court’s ruling that “he [is to be] executed” actually be carried out? Only after “there [are] some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf.” This is because, as explained above (based on the *Kesef Mishneh*), the fundamental purpose of the punishments imposed by the court is the atonement of the individual. And when does punishment bring about atonement? Only when it touches and awakens the good within him.

Therefore, when everyone sees only guilt — indicating that his inner good is completely concealed — the punishment cannot accomplish its purpose of bringing atonement to the Jew. It is only after someone argues in his favor — an act that itself draws

39) See *Sifrei* and *Rashi* on *Devarim* 1:13.

40) See *Sanhedrin* 6b (end), and the references there.

41) *Devarim* 17:9. “You are obligated to follow only the court of your own generation” (*Rambam*,

Hilchos Mamrim 2:1; and see *Sifrei* and *Rashi* on the verse).

out the good within him⁴² — that the punishment fulfills its purpose: the Jew attains atonement and merits a share in the World to Come.

8.

Every Jew Awaits the King in the Field

From the above, we can derive a lesson regarding the greatness and merit of the Jewish people:

Consider a Jew who has sunk to such a low state that even the *Sanhedrin* {can find no merit in him}. The Torah declares that the *Sanhedrin*'s task is {to fulfill the verse}, “and the congregation shall save” — to seek out and find a means of rescue and grounds for acquittal for every Jew. Yet even they see only guilt and no avenue for acquittal. Nevertheless, the Torah of Truth issues a clear ruling: such a reality cannot exist. Even such a Jew possesses the inner will to “perform all the *mitzvos*.” Consequently, this truth itself leads the *Sanhedrin* to argue in his defense, and through this, his inner will — the good within him — is ultimately revealed.

This applies all the more so to the Jews of our generation. Even though we are in a state of “I am asleep,”⁴³ nevertheless, “my heart is **awake**”⁴⁴ to the Holy One, blessed be He, to His Torah, and to His *mitzvos*.⁴⁵ And since, by the ruling of the Torah of **Truth**, the Jewish heart remains **awake**, it will ultimately be awakened and brought into open revelation.

This is especially true now, during the month of Elul, when the King (the Holy One, blessed be He) is in the field. At this time, “everyone who wishes is permitted (and able)”⁴⁶ to go out to greet Him (**in the field**), and He receives them all with a pleasant countenance and shows a smiling face to all.”⁴⁷

42) As is evident from the explanation of our Sages' teaching (*Arachin* 15b; *Rambam, Hilchos Deos* 7:3) that evil speech (*lashon hara*) “kills three” — including “the one of whom it is spoken” (even though he committed no transgression) — because evil speech reveals and brings out the evil within him. Since “the measure of good is greater {than the measure of punishment}” {(*Sotah* 11a)}, it follows that speaking in another's favor reveals the good within that person (all the more so when this is done by the *Sanhedrin*). See *Likkutei Sichos*, vol. 27, p. 163ff., for a more extensive discussion of the matter (including the explanation of the Rambam's

words, *Hilchos Deos* 5:7, “one speaks in praise of his fellow and not at all in his disparagement”), as well as the sources cited there.

43) *Shir HaShirim* 5:2.

44) {*Ibid.*}

45) See the *maamar* entitled *Ani Yesheinah* in *Sefer HaMaamarim – Yiddish*; and elsewhere.

46) An addition of the Frierdiker Rebbe — from the *maamar* entitled *Lecha Amar Libi*, 5700.

47) *Likkutei Torah, Re'eh*, p. 32a (end) ff.

Thus, we must go out and inspire every Jew, regardless of his present state, to reveal openly the inner will to greet the King in the field.

How is this accomplished? Through this very approach: when one argues and speaks in a Jew's favor — highlighting that **within him** lies an actual portion of G-d from above, a Divine spark, to the point that (in the Rambam's words) "he wants to be part of the Jewish people, wants to perform all the *mitzvos*, and wants to distance himself from transgressions," and that this constitutes his true essence — through this very act, one further reveals the good within him.

This inspires the Jew to "go out" from his present place ("**in the wilderness**")⁴⁸ in order to greet the King "**in the field.**"

As a result, not only is "some" of his good revealed ("some who seek to acquit him and argue on his behalf"), but it is revealed in abundant measure. This abundance of good and merit ultimately tips the scales to **outweigh** the opposing side within him, bringing him from a state in which he was "evenly balanced" to one of "deliverance and rescue,"⁴⁹ after which he emerges innocent in judgment.

Every Jew is thus awakened to true and complete *teshuvah*, thereby attaining complete atonement — as a whole soul within a healthy body, a soul within a body in this physical world (below ten handbreadths). And each and every one is immediately inscribed and sealed⁵⁰ in the book of the completely righteous for a good and sweet year, blessed with visible and revealed good in both material and spiritual matters alike.

From sichos delivered on Shabbos Parshas Ki Sisa, 5745 (1985)

48) See *Likkutei Torah*, ibid., p. 32b. See also *Likkutei Sichos*, vol. 4, p. 1343.

49) *Rambam, Hilchos Teshuvah* 3:4.

50) *Rosh Hashanah* 16b. See "the Midrash" (*Talmud Yerushalmi, Rosh Hashanah* 1:3; *Yalkut Shimoni, Vaeschanan, remez* 855), cited in the *Tur, Orach*

Chaim (end of sec. 581), which states that already on the eve of Rosh Hashanah the Jewish people are confident that they will merit {a favorable judgment}, and to the point that they wear {white}, etc.